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Abstract
The focus of this paper is on the house price stress test (termed ALMO) that was designed to assess the fiscal strength
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and, if necessary, to trigger remedial action in order to avert a crisis. We assess
whether the ALMO stress test was an adequate representation of an extremely weak housing market, given the best
available information leading up to the Great Recession. A Monte Carlo simulation model is developed to estimate
the severity of low probability events (i.e., severe house price declines). We illustrate the complexity and subjective
nature of the process used to generate a plausible house price stress test scenarios. A major finding is that the ALMO
stress test scenario severely understated (possibly by 50% or more) what an updated statistical process would have
suggested. Part of this stems from idiosyncrasies related to the construction and implementation of ALMO, while
other factors include a fundamental shift in the relationship between housing price appreciation and key explanatory
variables—especially over the past 10–15 years, which shows a heightened role of momentum in explaining changes
in housing prices. We offer several suggestions for a new stress test that include: continual updates and testing; variation across markets; and, like the recent FRB stress test, the scenario should be based on real (rather than nominal)
price patterns.
Keywords: housing, financial crisis, stress test

was previously underestimated and current data provide
what is believed to be a better estimate. If so and if protection from a 100 year flood is still the desire of the people of Louisiana, then new levees to protect against such
an event should be built stronger and higher. Second, if
the previous definitions of these stressful events were on
target, should the degree of protection provided by the
levees be increased to withstand something more severe
than a 100-year flood?1 In addressing these questions, one
study suggests that the previous definitions were accurate, but that a new and higher degree of protection ought
to be provided. “A 100-year level of levee protection from
hurricane storm surge is inadequate for a major city like
New Orleans, and officials should consider relocating residents out of the most vulnerable areas” (National Research Council, 2009).

1. Introduction

We begin this paper with an analogy to the issues to
be addressed. Consider the catastrophic hurricane of
2005—Katrina. The city of New Orleans did have protection against the ravages of flooding associated with hurricanes. Like all insurance plans, it was based upon a sense
of the distribution of the severity of hurricanes and the
cost curve relating levee cost to levels of protection. The
system in place was inadequate to protect New Orleans
so a series of studies were conducted to address two central questions. First, should the probability distribution of
flood severity be redefined and new levees built based on
the new information, holding constant the degree of protection thought to be provided by the previous system?
For example, perhaps the severity of a 100 year flood

1. A third possibility is that both the desired level of protection and the severity of a 100 year flood did not change, but the levees were flawed and
did not provide the level of protection advertised.
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Figure 1. Cumulative HP Decline under ALMO and FRB stress tests. Source: Authors’ calculations. ALMO nominal is the nominal house price decline used by FHFA (formerly OFHEO). ALMO (Real 1984–1987) expresses the ALMO scenario in real terms based on the actual rate of inflation
during the ALMO experience. ALMO (Real 1997–2000) expresses the ALMO scenario in real terms during a period with lower inflation.

1.1. Economic capital as a buffer
This paper undertakes a similar exercise, focusing not
on hurricanes and levees, but rather on the ongoing depression in many housing markets and economic capital, which US Banks and other financial institutions such
as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were required to hold
to protect against such severe economic events. As with
New Orleans and Katrina, the protection in place for
much of the US financial sector failed, so the same type
of questions can be asked. First, did the policies and risk
management systems in place prior to the Great Recession
understate the likelihood and extent of a serious decline
in house prices?2 This is akin to Katrina being caused by
an underestimation of the frequency of a 100 year flood.
Second, and aside from the first question, should the desired level of protection built into risk management systems and sought by government regulators be amended
to withstand events of greater severity? This is akin to
saying that policymakers had a good grasp of the frequency of a 100 year flood, but the latest flood was, say, a
200 year event. In the first case, risk management systems
should be recalibrated, based upon a more accurate and
up-to-date view of a severe house price shock. In the second case, analysts and regulators should reexamine evi-

dence to determine whether the benefits from increasing
the level of protection exceed the costs.
1.2. Motivation
The motivation for this paper is the collapse of US
mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and, in
particular, the house price stress test scenario applied
to these two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).
The test was designed to assess the economic strength
of these institutions and, if necessary, to trigger remedial action in order to avert a crisis. The stress scenario
is based upon congressional legislation that outlines the
degree of protection congress expected the GSEs to have
in place—a scenario sometimes referred to as the ALMO
stress test.3 Credit losses for the GSEs’ portfolios are projected using this scenario and a host of other assumptions,
including the probabilities of default on particular pools
of mortgages and the severity of losses in a stressful environment. These two home-mortgage securitizers were
required to hold enough capital to withstand the ALMO
stress test.4 The implementation of the stress test and the
monitoring of the institutions’ adherence to its implications falls under the purview of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).5

2. In addition to understating the likelihood of a sharp drop in housing prices, the economic implications of such a drop may too have been underestimated. For example, the interconnectedness of the mortgage industry throughout the financial sector may not have been fully appreciated.
3. ALMO stands for states Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Oklahoma. The ALMO stress test is based on the experiences of these states during the 1980s.
4. A stress test scenario for housing refers to a clearly-defined and sustained path of substantial declines in house prices. This low probability scenario is then used to predict the implications of such an event for financial institutions and for the broader economy.
5. FHFA was created by legislation signed in 2008 that merged the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). OFHEO officially went out of existence July 30, 2009—one year after the legislation was signed. Because most of
the period of our study pre-dates the creation of FHFB, we generally refer to OFHEO as the regulatory body governing the GSEs and attribute
data and models now housed by FHFA to OFHEO.
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Before proceeding, consider four important characteristics of OFHEO’s ALMO house price stress scenario:
1. Most importantly, the house price pattern was constructed to simulate a weak housing market. The
ALMO stress scenario is a ten year path of house prices
in which prices are relatively flat for the first two years
and then decline by about 13% over the next three
years. Beyond year five, house prices rise such that the
net change after 10 years is about zero (see Figure 1).
2. The ALMO stress test is measured in nominal terms;
there is no adjustment for variation in inflation across
time-periods. Because ALMO was measured in nominal terms, it implies a more (less) severe stress scenario
for periods where inflation is higher (lower) than during the 1984–1993 ALMO period. During the run-up in
US housing prices from 1997 to 2006, low inflation resulted in an ALMO stress scenario that was 20% weaker
in real terms than the actual ALMO experience (from
1984 to 1993).6 The dotted line in Figure 1 shows the actual ALMO scenario converted to real terms and beginning in 1997. By contrast, the dashed line shows what
the ALMO path would have been, had it been defined
in real terms (and thus adjusted for the inflation rate beginning in 1984). The difference between the two lines
is driven by the difference in the inflation rate between
the two periods. Because ALMO was specified in nominal terms, it substantially lessens the severity of the
stress test for this low-inflation period. However, had
ALMO been defined in real terms from the beginning,
it would (at least for the first eight quarters) still represent a much less severe scenario than the 2009 FRB base
scenario (FRB, 2009). Differences in inflation across the
two periods accounts for about 40% of the difference
between the ALMO and FRB base scenarios.7
3. The scenario was not updated or amended as new information became available and economic circumstances
changed; that is, the same specific scenario was applied
each year until the GSEs went into conservatorship in
September 2008.
4. The scenario is applied to all mortgages without consideration for the geographic location of the property un-

derlying the mortgage. For example, the same scenario
was applied to loans secured by houses in Los Angeles and those in rural North Dakota. Likewise, the scenario did not change as lending standards became more
lax, higher-risk borrowers entered the market en masse,
and the complexity and breadth of mortgage securitization increased.
1.3. Goals and approach
The primary goal of this paper is to examine whether the
ALMO stress test was an adequate representation of an extremely weak housing market using the best available information up until the Great Recession. We pursue this goal
by estimating a variety of regression specifications for real
house price growth and then develop a Monte Carlo simulation model to estimate low probability events. Extreme scenarios are defined as those paths over a threeyear period
that represents the worst 1% and 5% outcomes. The specifications are estimated using quarterly data on house prices
from OFHEO for all fifty states and for years 1975–2009. We
pay particular attention to variations in the definitions of
stressful scenarios based upon the time-periods and groups
of states included in the estimation. We also conduct a variety of sensitivity analyses to learn more about the nature
and robustness of a more up-to-date stress test scenario.
A second goal of this paper is to illustrate the complexity and subjective nature of the process used to generate a
plausible house price stress test scenario.8 To that end, this
paper highlights the numerous assumptions, sensitivity
analyses, and other judgments necessary to define an extreme house price event. This issue is raised because of the
emphasis on transparency in many ongoing discussions
about regulatory reform. For example, the importance of
transparency was raised by the congressional oversight
panel in its review and critique of the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB) stress test, which we discuss in the next section. While the report praised the FRB efforts, it also said
that “additional transparency would be helpful both to assess the strength of the banks and to restore confidence in
the banking system.” While we agree that more information about the details of the stress test would be helpful,

6. From 1997 to 2006, the CPI increased by roughly 25%, compared to 40% for years 1984–1993.
7. We are not positing that real price changes are the main driver of mortgage default. Indeed, nominal price appreciation is the critical driver;
however, we do advocate basing the specific nominal stress test (applied in any given environment) on a severe real housing price scenario.
The real scenario should be adjusted to account for expected inflation in the new environment, thus keeping the real value of the stress test constant across inflationary environments. This was not the case with the ALMO stress test. It held the nominal stress test constant while allowing
the real value to vary among inflationary environments. While the real impact of ALMO’s severity is understated for periods with low inflation
rates, nominal price changes are important to monitor. Nominal housing price changes are likely more important than real price changes in determining default. Absent nominal price changes, inflation lowers house prices by the rate of inflation, however, inflation also lowers outstanding mortgage debt by the exact same percentage (in real terms). In the presence of deflation (along with nominal drops in house prices), it is possible for mortgages to become “under water” even with real house price appreciation, since, again in real terms, mortgage debt is increasing
more rapidly than house prices. Of course, in modeling default, it also important to examine the relationship between inflation and mortgage interest rates, since many times refinancing may be a better alternative than default.
8. Because of the recent crisis, even the notion of a stress test has fundamentally changed. Until recently, the most serious risk faced by financial institutions invested in the mortgage market was believed to result from rising interest rates—which could in turn result in falling house values.
The notion of plummeting house prices along with stable (or low) interest rates was often not on the radar screen. For example, see Stiglitz et al.
(2002), who, in examining the risks that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac posed to the public, conclude that the probability of default by the GSEs
is extremely small. In fact, they report that the GSEs could withstand a stress scenario that they estimate that has a less than one if 500,000 likelihood of occurring. Stiglitz et al. (2002) also note that the office of management and budget (OMB) had looked at the GSEs’ ability to withstand
a ten-year great depression-like scenario. In describing OMB’s analysis, they report that, assuming 1990s levels of capital, “the probability of either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac defaulting would be ’close to zero.”
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our conclusion is that transparency will not be sufficient to
bring about widespread agreement about the appropriate
stress test because, at its core, predicting extreme events is
very difficult and evidence to define these events will not
be equally compelling to all.
1.4. Findings
This paper finds that OFHEO’s ALMO stress test scenario, in place at the beginning of the Great Recession severely understated what a more robust and updated
statistical process would have suggested. As shown in subsequent sections, such a process would have implied a scenario with more than double the price declines of ALMO.
Part of this stems from a fundamental shift in the relationship between housing price appreciation and key explanatory variables—especially over the past 10–15 years,
which shows a heightened role of momentum in explaining changes in housing prices. A variation of this paper’s
preferred scenario incorporates the potential for a substantial drop in employment growth, which in many cases results in an additional 20–30 percentage point drop in housing prices (over a three year period).
Several broad policy implications stem from our analysis. First and foremost, a regulatory stress test should be subject to ongoing scrutiny. A legislatively mandated stress test
scenario without a process to provide scrutiny and updating seems inadequate to capture the dynamics of the housing and mortgage markets. Second, regulators cannot be expected to produce evidence of an extreme event that is both
compelling to everyone and transparent. At some point,
their independent and informed judgments must play a critical role. Third, a stress scenario should be constructed in
real terms; otherwise, the effective severity of the stress test
is driven by inflation (or expected inflation). Fourth, housing
markets are influenced by both local and national (and international) factors. Heterogeneity across local housing markets should be acknowledged and taken into account when
constructing and implementing stress tests.
1.5. Caveats
It is important to keep in mind several important caveats when drawing conclusions and policy implications
from this work. First and most importantly, this paper eschews a full-scale autopsy of the reasons for the recent
collapse in house prices and the unprecedented spike in
mortgage foreclosures. The causes are numerous, the debate and evaluation ongoing and it is still too early to estimate anything remotely close to a fully specified structural
model that captures the myriad of factors and players underlying the crisis. Additionally, with so many factors at
play, at the margin, any one of them could have pushed the
financial sector over the edge. Nonetheless, and as demonstrated in this paper, the estimated reduced form econometric models do highlight patterns and changes occurring in recent years, providing insights into improving the
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specification of a stress test, our primary goal. In particular,
some of the patterns confirm and even enhance long-standing views among many analysts about the heterogeneity of
housing markets and, especially the widely disparate impacts of interest rate shocks and sharp distinctions in the
house price process among high price variance versus
other states. Another striking pattern is a sharp increase in
the relative importance of lagged house price growth versus lagged employment growth, which seems consistent
with the views of Robert Shiller and others who emphasize the role of overblown and unsustainable expectations
about house price appreciation in the early 2000s. More
generally, plausible versions of a basic reduced form equation seem to have changed in important ways, which leads
us to make the case for new and more severe stress tests for
the mortgage and home finance markets.
Second, the focus here is upon the stress test scenario fed
into the larger model used by OFHEO to compute regulatory risk-based capital for the GSEs. No attention is given to
the many other features of the process, which will undoubtedly be found to have their own systematic shortcomings
upon careful scrutiny and updating. In particular, the size
and implications of a severe stress scenario may be very different in a different institutional environment. Obviously,
getting the institutions right is a tremendously important
and difficult task—and again, one that is not addressed here.
Third, a technical note, our focus is on a stress scenario
for a representative state (or a composite state). Another alternative is to pick one based upon a representative sample
of states. This becomes important if geographic diversification is thought to be critical. Indeed, earlier work on Basel II
(see Calem and Follain (2003)) found that a nationally diversified portfolio would be expected to have 40% of the capital associated with a regionally concentrated portfolio. That
conclusion may also need to be reexamined in light of more
recent history. Rather than pursue the issue in this paper,
which is a major and complex effort in itself, we choose to
state it as a caveat that warrants additional research. However, such considerations would only alter the specific sizes
of the stress test scenario, but not the relative rankings or
the broader qualitative issues that we raise and identify.
Fourth, we are silent about the role of the GSEs themselves. We have in mind their ongoing responsibility to
monitor what they (and their shareholders, which for
the time being is primarily the federal government itself) consider to be prudent amounts of economic capital above and beyond what is required by regulators.9
In fact, one of us (Follain) was part of a group at Freddie Mac from 2000 to 2002 with the mission of looking
into this issue. A particularly interesting and intriguing
question is what the internal monitors of credit risk capital for mortgages were finding and saying to senior management and the Board of Directors in the months and
years leading up to the collapse. It appears that they also
underestimated events such as Great Recession. It would
seem appropriate to release more information on their
thinking.

9. However, given that these institutions are already insolvent (save for government rescue), it is unlikely that they have the means to increase
their economic capital, absent additional assistance.
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2. Recent literature and background
This paper is part of a large and burgeoning literature
addressing the current mortgage crisis, its causes, and potential remedies. Two aspects of this vast literature are of
intense focus here. The first is the research on bank capital and the GSEs. This portion of the literature places the
development and use of stress tests in the context of the
broader issue of setting regulatory capital guidelines for
large financial institutions. The second (area of focus) is
the large body of work on the drivers of house prices. This
has been a research focus, especially in the field of real estate and urban economics, for many years. A recent surge
is underway in this literature to explore the reasons for the
collapse in house prices and the accuracy of the previous
structural models of house prices to explain the collapse.
The goal of this survey section is not to provide a comprehensive overview of this literature, but rather to motivate
and contextualize our decision to focus upon a relatively
simple model of house price growth.
2.1. The role of a stress test scenario for economic capital
The function of regulatory capital is to provide financial
institutions with sufficient (liquid) assets to withstand a serious deterioration or elimination of its net worth. The capital is usually expressed as a percent of the institution’s assets. This is how leverage requirement rules are defined.
Risk-based capital rules, like those proposed for Basel II, allow the final percentage to vary with the riskiness of the
bank’s portfolio.10 Various methods have been proposed
to help institutions and regulators determine and maintain
optimal economic capital to assets ratio. Some, like Basel II,
are rulesbased, but are also risk-adjusted. Calem and Follain (2003) present an example that illustrates how the proposed Basel II rules would be applied for mortgages. The
paper’s focus rests upon one formula embedded in the Basel II framework. A parameter in that formula (central to
the process) is the correlation between mortgage default
and a single state variable intended to capture the major
economic forces that drive this process. Calem and Follain
(2003) examine a variety of benchmarks in estimating the
assetcorrelation parameter for mortgages that offer the protection proposed in Basel II—which would require portfolios to be no riskier than BBB+ bonds (which are sometimes
termed “medium safe”). Given the rule and Basel II’s assumed asset-correlation parameter of 15%, banks would
compute their required regulatory capital by inserting into
formulas other information about their mortgage portfolio—e.g., estimates of the current probability of default
(pd) and loss given default (LGD).
In contrast to Basel II, Congress created OFHEO (in
1992) and charged them to carry out a different approach
for estimating risk-based capital requirements for mortgages backed by the two GSEs. This approach is built
around a large and complex model used to measure the
credit losses of the portfolios held by the GSEs. Specific
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characteristics of the mortgages are entered into a set of
equations that outputs estimated default probabilities for
various categories of mortgages. The model also estimates
losses given default in a stress scenario, the potential value
of existing credit enhancements, and many other factors.
A critical part of this system is the OFHEO (also referred
to as ALMO) stress test, which is a projected path of national house prices during a ten year stress period. The
GSEs were required to hold enough capital to withstand
this stress test scenario. The specifics of this stress scenario
were presented in the introduction.
The FRB employs another alternative in conducting its
2009 stress test. Like the OFHEO stress test, the FRB stress
test specified the severity of house price declines. Unlike
the OFHEO stress test, the process the FRB followed not
set by legislation. While many of the details have not been
made public, the FRB test appears to have been based upon
expert opinions, recent historical trends and internal judgments. The FRB stress test was then applied using internal and proprietary models of the financial institutions affected—which were also not made public. While many of
the details remain secret, it seems clear that the FRB felt
that the OFHEO stress scenario was not severe enough
(again see the Figure 1).
A recent paper by Löffler (2009) is very much in the
spirit of our work. In addressing a similar question, Löffler employs an AR(1) model, using national house price
data, to test whether the actual decline in house prices is
consistent with his simulation results. He answers affirmatively; that is, his AR(1) model applied to the OFHEO data
series for the entire US from 1975 to 2005 could produce extreme outcomes that include what has actually happened.
However, applying the same approach to Case-Shiller data
for 20 large cities yields a different conclusion. We will offer similar insights—the answer depends upon which data
and which model one uses to generate distributions for future changes to house prices.
2.2. Reduced form versus structural model of house prices
The literature exploring house price movements is immense and growing rapidly.11 It includes traditional multiple equation structural models with a wide variety of
exogenous variables, as well as time-series and VAR approaches. (See Malpezzi (1999) for a good example of the
latter approach.) These models are estimated with national,
state and metropolitan-level data. Through the course of
this research project, we have explored a wide array of
models; however, the analysis in the following sections is
based upon the estimation of a single-equation time-series
model with lagged values of several economic variables
as well grouped-state dummies and year fixed effects.
Though we recognize that such a model is unable (and
does not even attempt) to sort out the numerous and evolving factors that have contributed to the massive declines in
house prices, we do feel it is an appropriate approach for
our purposes for several reasons.

10. For the a recent statement from the FRB regarding the status of Basel II, see http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-17555.pdf
11. For example, note the recent spate of articles published in the Journal of Housing Economics: http://www.citeulike.org/journal/els-10511377
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One particular variable, the user cost of capital, is omitted, even though it is quite common in house price model;
thus, an explanation for omitting it is in order. The user cost
of capital can be expressed such that uc = (i – π)P, where i
is an interest rate, π is the expected rate of future price appreciation of housing, and P is the price of housing stock.
The role of user cost is firmly ingrained in standard theories
of investment and housing economists have written scores
of articles investigating its role in a wide variety of situations.12 We omit user cost because it rests upon an important assumption that, in our view, cannot be adequately defended given the experiences of the 2000s. That assumption
is that we can estimate with confidence the expected rate of
housing price appreciation. However, it appears that expectations about future of house prices have diverted in fundamental ways from views previously held by mainstream
housing economists. The simplest explanation is that expectations were “irrational”—an idea long championed by
Robert Shiller and a result found throughout the experimental literature on asset bubbles (Caginalp et al., 2000).
This view holds that expectations can be heavily influenced
by recent price changes and that the five to ten years leading up to the 2006 peak were dominated by positive momentum. Thus, prices became much less rooted to longterm benchmarks. So this critical input to user cost seems
very difficult to measure with any confidence. Follain (2008)
elaborates on this point, with specific references to the ideas
of Shiller and his longtime collaborator, Karl Case.
This view is not universally held. In fact, several recent papers have estimated house price models with a user
cost component. These include Goodman and Thibodeau
(2008), Case and Quigley (2009) and Gabriel et al. (2008).
These papers necessarily rely upon a rule or benchmark to
specify user cost and by using these previous benchmarks
can identify a widely held view—house prices were destined to decline and the bubble to burst. We surely agree
with this prediction, but it is based upon some measurable and exogenous benchmark of expected house price inflation. Our approach circumvents this step, allowing us
to remain agnostic with respect to expected housing price
appreciation. Instead, we include two key interest rate
measures and lagged values of house price growth. As is
demonstrated in the next two sections, this specification
shows substantial increases in the relative importance of
lagged inflation as a predictor of changes to house prices
in the latter years. This is consistent with the basic views
of Case and Shiller and runs counter to an approach that
rests upon steady measures of expected inflation. Something dramatic happened to these expectations in the last
10 years that seems outside of any previous benchmarks.
Until more is learned about how to model these expectations, a less specific and less structural approach may have
substantial advantages.
The model we estimate includes lagged values of the dependent variable as well as lags of all of the other state-specific covariates, such as employment. Some papers focus
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attention on a more precise and statistically driven specification and interpretation of the lagged terms on the endogenous variables. One example is Capozza et al. (2004).
They develop a dynamic difference equation with autoregressive error terms. This approach includes a parameters
that encompass a wide range of possible outcomes from
mean reversion to the other extreme of divergent oscillation. They also include economic variables intended to
proxy for information costs, supply costs, and expectations.
Their empirical analysis uses data for 62 large metro areas
for the years 1979–1995. Based on estimates from various
lag structures, they calculate specific measures of mean reversion versus momentum. They find wide variations in
the estimated coefficients and the implied dynamic behavior among the metropolitan areas and conclude that the dynamic properties of housing markets are specific to time
and location.
In another paper, Lai and Order (2010) also develop and
estimate a dynamic difference equation with the potential to measure mean reversion and momentum. They use
data for 44 MSAs from 1980 to 2005 and rely on an equilibrium relationship between rents and values. They report
evidence of momentum throughout the period; however,
momentum increased substantially after 1999 resulting in
what could be characterized as a bubble after 2003.
Our results also shed light on these issues, but our approach is simpler and, again, imposes less structure on the
coefficients. As mentioned above, our approach also includes several lags of the key variables. We chose four
quarterly lags as a plausable starting specification but did
not pursue or test for the possibility of a unique or optimal
lag structure for all groups and time periods examined. Instead, we highlight the sum of the lagged coefficients of
the lagged house price terms as an indicator of the potential of the momentum effect. All else equal, a positive sum
of these coefficients is interpreted as momentum; the larger
the sum the stronger the momentum. A negative sum is interpreted as mean reversion.
3. Data and estimation
3.1. Data
Several sources are used to create quarterly time-series datasets for each of the 50 US states and D.C. The data
extend from the beginning of 1975 to the third quarter of
2009. Housing price data are from OFHEO’s state housing
price index (HPI).13 HPI is a repeat-sales index that measures state-level price growth for single family housing and
includes housing purchased using conventional mortgages
that is subsequently purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Interest rate data rates for Treasury notes and bills are from US Treasury (and are available from numerous sources). Quarterly data on nonfarm
employment are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).

12. One of us (Follain) has written many articles that highlight the potential role of user cost as it relates to housing, including one that was written
over 25 years ago (Follain, 1982).
13. As noted earlier, in 2009 OFHEO was absorbed into the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
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Data on each state (along with the interest rate variables)
are pooled into one large dataset comprising 7089 observations (139 observations for each of the 50 states and D.C.).
States are separated into three groups in order to compare the experiences of states with different characteristics. The state groupings are constructed by ranking states
by the variance of their HPI from 1991 to 2009. States with
more housing price variability are likely to respond differently to exogenous changes than are states with lower
variances. For example, housing supply may be more inelastic in these states. (See Goodman and Thibodeau, 2008,
and Harter-Dreiman, 2004, for recent empirical findings on
housing supply elasticities.) The state groupings are:
1. Delaware, Massachusetts, California, Rhode Island, New
York, New Jersey, Maryland, New Hampshire, Hawaii,
Florida, Maine, Virginia, Oregon, Washington, Arizona,
D.C. and Nevada. These are the high-variance states.
Also, note that these states are primarily “coastal” and
are often characterized by large MSAs where land (or
housing) is relatively constrained.
2. Connecticut, Vermont, Minnesota, Colorado, Montana,
Utah, Pennsylvania, Idaho, Wyoming, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, New Mexico, Georgia, Alaska, South
Carolina and Missouri. These are the medium-variance
states.
3. South Dakota, North Carolina, Louisiana, Tennessee,
North Dakota, Kentucky, Alabama, Kansas, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, Arkansas, West Virginia, Ohio,
Texas, Oklahoma and Indiana. These are the low-variance states. In general, the population centers of these
states are not characterized by binding land (or housing) constraints. Traffic congestion is also less severe
in the population centers of these states, and thus, the
non-pecuniary costs of living farther from the central
business district, for example, are relatively low.
Table 1 compares summary statistics for each of these
three groups for all years and for two sub-periods, 1975– 1990
Table 1. Annual growth rates.
All
1975–2009
RealHPIa
1.2
Employmenta 2.1
TB10b
–0.14
TB10 – TB1b
0.10
1975–1990
RealHPIa
0.7
Employmenta 2.5
TB10b
–0.01
TB10 – TB1b
0.09
1991–2009
RealHPIa
1.5
Employmenta 1.2
TB10b
–0.25
TB10 –TB1b
0.11

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

2.4
2.3

0.7
1.7

0.0
2.2

2.7
3.0

–0.1
2.0

–1.2
2.4

and 1991–2009. Real HPI growth (weighted by state employment) varies greatly over time and across state groups.
By definition, HPI variability falls as one moves from
group 1 to group 3. However, it is also true that states with
higher price variances also experienced the greatest increases in real housing prices from 1975 to 2009. When including all years, real annual HPI appreciation for group 1
is four times that for group 2—the HPI for group 3 states
is the same (in real terms) after quarter 3 of 2009 as it was
when the dataset began in quarter 1 of 1975. Breaking these
numbers down by time-period shows even greater disparity across groups from 1975 to 1990. Post-1991, the picture is quite different. Here, HPI growth is stable across all
three groups of states (ranging from a low HPI increase of
1.2% to a high of 1.6%).
Comparing the two time-periods, overall real HPI
growth is over twice as large post-1991 than pre-1990
(1.5% versus 0.7%)—even after accounting for the substantial drop in housing prices beginning in 2006. For group
1 states, average annual HPI growth drops from 2.7% pre
1991 to 1.6% post 1990. For the other two groups, the reverse is true: negative growth pre 1990 is followed by average annual growth that ranges from 1.2 to 1.5% post 1991.
Figure 2 plots the real HPI for each of the three groups
of states. By construction, all groups start at a value of 100
in 1975. The trend for each group is based on the weighted
average HPI for states within the group—where the averages are weighted by state employment. The direction of
changes is similar for groups 1 and 2, but the pattern is
greatly amplified for group 1—with both much more precipitous increases and decreases. The pattern for group 3 is
a muted version of that for group 2, except during the second half of the 1980s, where the two trends diverge. In contrast to HPI growth, employment growth is much more robust pre-1990 than post-1991. This is due primarily to the
dismal rate of US employment growth during the first decade of the 2000s (see Irwin, 2010). The pattern is similar
for each of the groups; however, the drop in employment
growth is more pronounced for group 1 states, where the
annual growth rate fell by 1.8 percentage points (versus 1
percentage point for group 2 and 3 states).
3.2. Estimation approach
Equation 1 relates housing price appreciation to fundamentals that are believed to influence housing prices. It includes time and fixed effects for state groups in order to absorb unobserved factors and can be expressed such that:
log

1.6
1.2

1.5
1.0

1.2
1.4

Calculations are based on data from FHFA (formerly OFHEO), BLS,
and U.S. Treasury.
a. Measured in percent change.
b. Measured in percentage point change.

(

)

(

4
HPit
HPit–j
= t + group + season + ∑
HPit–1
j=1 HPit–1–j
4

+∑

j=1

(

Empit–j

Empit–1–j

+ δ2TB10t + εit

)

)

+ δ1(TB10t–4 – TB1t–4 )
(1)

The dependent variable, log(HPit/HPit–1), measures the
quarterly growth rate in real housing prices (HP) for state i
in time t. The explanatory variables include lags of housing
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5. High price variance states for years 1975 to quarter 4
of 1990.
6. Medium and low price variance states for years 1975
to quarter 4 of 1990.
7. Observations from 1991 to quarter 3 of 2009.
8. High price variance states for years 1991 to quarter 3
of 2009.
9. Medium and low price variance for years 1990 to
quarter 3 of 2009.
10. Observations from 1975 to quarter 4 of 2000.

Figure 2. Real housing price appreciation by state group. Calculations are based on FHFA’s (formerly OFHEO) state housing price index. The housing price index is normalized to 100 for all states in 1975.
Group averages are weighted by state employment. See Section 3 for
state groupings.

price growth, log(HPit–j/HPit–1–j), and lags of employment
growth, log(Empit–j/Empit–1–j), for the preceding four quarters, where j represents lagged quarters one to four. Housing price lags are included to help distinguish between
markets characterized by price momentum and those
where mean reversion is more prominent. Momentum (or
self-reinforcing) effects would include bubbles, where behavior such as speculation can lead to periods of rapid
price increases and, after peaking, rapid price decreases.
Lags in employment growth are intended to pick up more
traditional changes in housing demand. The ten-year treasury rate (TB10) is included because it is correlated with
mortgage interest rates and is also exogenous (i.e., not influenced by changing lending practices, etc.). Additionally,
a one-year lag of the yield spread (TB10t–4 – TB1t–4) is also
included because it has been shown to be a good predictor
of real economic activity (e.g., see Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Estrella and Mishkin, 1998). Additionally, dummies for state-group (group), time (t) and seasonal (season)
are included in the equation.
As an alternative to group dummies, full state fixed effects could be included in the model. This would impose
stronger controls for heterogeneity across states, but would
reduce the degrees of freedom and wash away withingroup cross-sectional variation. Results in the following sections are not sensitive to several alternative criteria
for grouping states. For example, results from employing
groupings used by Abraham and Hendershott (1994) OFHEO has only a nominal effect on the results.
By imposing a variety of sample restrictions, we test
whether the relationships described in Equation 1 have
changed over time and whether they vary by region. To
this end, Equation 1 is estimated for the following samples:
1. All observations (from 1975 to quarter 3 of 2009).
2. High price variance states.
3. Medium and low price variance states.
4. Observations from 1975 to quarter 4 of 1990.

By comparing estimated coefficients when employing
these different sample restrictions, we test whether the relationship between the explanatory variables and housing price growth varies across states. For example, housing prices in states where housing supply is more inelastic
should be more responsive to the explanatory variables.
Furthermore, changes to political and economic institutions could alter the relationship between the explanatory
variables and housing price growth. And, it is possible that
these changes had a heterogeneous impact across the country. Results from the regression analysis can be used to examine these questions.
The fixed effects can be thought of as measuring the influence of an array of factors that are not explicitly included
in the estimation—and which often are not available in sufficient detail over a long period of time. Additionally, if,
over time, there are major shifts in the relationship between
explanatory variables and housing price growth, then our
insight into the factors that led to the collapse of major
components of the US financial sector may be limited. As
addressed in a later section, a heavy reliance on fixed effects makes it difficult to assign a relative importance to the
array of factors that may have contributed to the sharp decline in the housing market and the broader turmoil that
spread through the economy more generally, however, we
show that our analysis can be used to assign probabilities
to various severe economic events—even if the proximate
cause of the economic stress remains opaque.
4. Evaluation of model estimates and implications
In this section estimates are presented for the model developed in the previous section. The factors correlated with
housing price growth are examined for the full sample and
then compared to estimates for the various subsamples in
order to highlight possible heterogeneity in this relationship
over time and across states. Additionally, the regression results are important because they lay the foundation for the
simulation and stress test conducted later in this section.
4.1. Review of regression estimates
Table 2 presents regression estimates for Equation (1)
under the ten different sample restrictions. Estimated coefficients for the four employment growth lags vary greatly
by specification, but consistent with theory, are always positive. As a caveat, while employment is a core fundamental
in determining housing prices, the theoretical foundations
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simulations for new house price stress test

Calculations based on data from FHFA (formerly OFHEO), BLS, and US Treasury. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are unweighted (i.e., not weighted by
employment). All specifications also include year fixed effects.
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Table 2. Estimation results for 10 combinations of time period and states dependent variable: ln(HPt/HPt–1).
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109

0.350
0.493
–0.009
0.001
0.055
0.636
0.424
–0.007
0.005
0.041
0.455
0.655
–0.008
0.003
0.048
Calculations based on data from FHFA (formerly OFHEO), BLS, and US Treasury.
a. This is the aggregate of the estimated coefficients on the four lagged variables.
b. This is the estimated constant term plus the average of the estimated coefficients on the years dummies.
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14. Another explanation for what we characterize as mean-reverting
phenomena, is simply data noise. Under this scenario, which cannot
be ruled out, an outlier (due to measurement error) in one period is
corrected in the next period.

Years:

4.1.2. Insights from comparing results from the subsamples
Recall that the US experience over the past decade has
been unique, not only in the magnitude of price appreciation (and subsequent price depreciation), but also in scope.
Never before (or at least since the advent of modern houseprice indexes) has housing price appreciation been so

Table 3. Summarizing key coefficients.

Table 3 presents a summary of the key results from the
regressions. Estimated coefficients on the lagged variables
are summed to assess the cumulative impact of lagged
housing price and employment growth, respectively. Column 1 of Table 2 shows a strong relationship between
lagged employment and housing prices; a 1% increase in
employment over each of the previous 4 quarters is associated with a 1.36% increase in real housing prices. The relationship between lagged housing price growth and current housing price growth is negative; a 1% increase in real
housing prices over each of the previous 4 quarters is associated with a –0.26% change in current housing prices
(again adjusted for inflation). This pattern is inconsistent
with pricing bubbles, since price increases, ceteris paribus,
are generally followed by decreases and vice-versa.

All

4.1.1. Insights from the full sample

Journal

Unweighted regressions
Sum of Emp lags a
Sum of HP lags a
T10
TB10t–4 – TB1t–4
Constant + Average F.E. b

All
2&3
1
2&3
1

(6)
(5)

in

All

1991–2009

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

for the relationship between changes in employment and
changes in house prices is less clear. To the extent that
changes in employment (which influence housing demand) are expected, they should already be factored into
housing prices, preventing opportunities for arbitrage.
Thus, changes in housing prices should only affect housing prices to the extent that these changes are unexpected.
This is a parallel to the random walk hypothesis for stock
prices. However, the extent to which housing markets are
efficient in this respect is not a settled issue (see, e.g., Case
and Shiller, 1989; Shiller, 2005).
Turning to lagged housing price appreciation, estimated
coefficients are negative (at least for lags from the two previous quarters) for all samples that include pre-1991 data
(columns 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 of Table 2). This suggests
mean reversion: price increases (decreases) in one quarter are followed by price decreases (increases). This is also
inconsistent with pricing bubbles. By contrast, the corresponding lagged coefficients are generally positive for all
of the post-1990 samples (columns 2, 7, and 9 of Table 2).
And, among the specifications including only post-1990
data, estimated coefficients on the housing price lags are
much larger when group 1 (i.e., high variance) states are included in the sample. Taken together, this suggests that a
change occurred not just in the magnitude of the relationship between housing price growth and the lags, but also
in the direction of that relationship. The pattern in this later
period is consistent with bubble phenomena (although
other explanations also exist), where price changes in one
quarter are self-reinforcing in subsequent quarters.14

1975–2000
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1975–1990		
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widespread, with similar phenomena observed across
much of the country (with only a few exceptions). However, while the trends have been more homogeneous than
in the past, the degree to which prices changed did vary
greatly across the country. The high price variance states
have seen sharper price increases followed by sharper decreases over the past two decades than have the primarily
medium and low price variance states (again, see Figure 2).
A comparison of the sum of lagged coefficients for the high
price variance and medium and low price variance regressions buttresses the patterns observed in the data.
Regression results (presented in Table 3) are suggestive
of a structural change in the relationship between housing
price appreciation and the explanatory variables. The pre1991 regression (Table 3, column 4) yields cumulative effects from lagged employment and lagged housing prices
that are similar to those from the full sample. However, the
relationship between both sets of lags and house price appreciation is amplified. The sum of both the employment
and housing price lags are larger in absolute magnitude,
suggesting greater reliance on employment growth (a core
fundamental) and also that a change in housing prices will
be followed by a more rapid (or larger) reversion in the opposite direction (which again is inconsistent with selfreinforcing price bubbles).15 This is in stark contrast to the post1990 regression (Table 3, column 7), where the sum of the
employment lags is 0.42, or 71% smaller than for the pre1991 period. Turning to the housing price lags, the difference in the cumulative measure is even more startling.
Post-1990, the cumulative housing price lags equal 0.62—
i.e., very close in absolute magnitude to the measure for the
pre-1991 period (–0.57), but the direction of the relationship
has reversed (from negative to positive)! This suggests a
shift away from fundamentals and towards a market characterized by momentum and pricing bubbles. Post-1990
period, lagged housing price growth does not act to offset
current growth as the momentum effect dominates, leading
to ever larger price appreciation; likewise, price declines
are self-reinforcing, leading to even sharper price declines.
Weighting the regressions by employment (so that
larger states are given more importance than smaller ones)
paints a somewhat different picture. Again, see Table 3.
When including all years, momentum now tends to dominate. For group 2 and 3 states, mean reversion is still present, but is very modest. For the group 1 states, momentum
dominates. It may be that momentum is more pronounced
in some of the larger states within group 1. For example,
California, New York and Florida are in group 1 and all
saw sharp runups in house prices. These three states constitute less than 18% of the group 1 sample (i.e., three of 17
states), but roughly 55% of group 1 employment. Thus, for
the group 1 regressions, employment weighting increases
the importance of these three states by more than threefold.
In any case, with employment weighting, what we characterize as momentum increases sharply for all groups when
moving from the pre 1990 to post 1991 specifications (consistent with the unweighted results).
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For each of the ten (unweighted) specifications, F-tests
find that the cumulative impact of the employment growth
lags are statistically different from 0 at nearly any level of
significance. The one exception is the pre-1991 specification
for the high variance states, where the lagged employment
variables have a p-value of 0.051. Turning to the housing
price lags, F-tests find that, for seven of the specifications,
the cumulative effect of the lags are statistically different
from 0 at nearly any level of significance. However, for the
three of the five specifications that include pre-1991 data
for high price variance states (specifications shown in columns 1, 4, and 6 of Table 2), the cumulative effect of the
housing price lags is not statistically different from 0—a result consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis.16
Next, a χ2 test is employed to assess the statistical importance of the apparent structural break shown in Table 3.
In comparing the pre-1991 and post-1990 regressions (columns 4 and 7 from Table 2), the χ2 test results are consistent
with a structural break for both employment and housing
prices; i.e., the null that the sum of the coefficients on the
lagged housing price variables are equal in the two regressions is rejected at virtually any significance level; and, the
same is true when testing for the equality of the sum of the
coefficients on the lagged employment terms. This same
result is found again when comparing pre-1991with post1990 regressions that include only the states with low and
moderate house price variances (columns 6 and 9 of Table
2). Looking only at the high price variance states (columns
5 and 8 of Table 2), the χ2 test results are again consistent
with a structural break for the housing price lags (at the
1% level), but not for the employment lags (even though
the sum of the lagged employment coefficients pre-1991 is
about 1.5 times larger than the equivalent post-1990 measure). Finally, when comparing high price variance states
to medium and low price variance states, the null that the
sum of the coefficients are the same for the two groups can
never be rejected for both employment and housing prices.
4.1.3. Other factors to consider
Estimated coefficients for the other two economic variables—TB10 and the yield spread lagged four quarters—also
show variability across both state grouping and time. The
estimated coefficient for TB10 is consistently negative and
statistically significant, implying that lower long-term interest rates are associated with higher housing prices. As noted
earlier, changes to TB10 are a proxy for changes in mortgage rates, but are likely exogenous, since they are not influenced by changes to the characteristics of borrowers (such
as their probabilities of default). Also, recall that TB10 is
not in log form (and is not differenced), since this has important implications for interpreting the estimated coefficients. In contrast to employment growth, the estimated coefficients on TB10 are much larger (in absolute magnitude)
post-1990 than pre-1991. The difference across time-periods
is, at least partly, due to the much higher inflation pre-1991
and to the fact that TB10 is a nominal interest rate (whereas
housing price growth is measured in real terms). High real

15. This result is consistent with arguments made by Shiller (2005).
16. When including all of the data, the housing price lags are statistically significant at the 10% level. For the other two specifications (columns 4
and 6 from Table 2), these lags have p-values in excess of 0.3.
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interest rates discourage home-buying, whereas high nominal rates (along with expectations for high inflation) should
not. Across states, the relationship is stronger for the lower
price variation states than for the high variation states—possibly suggesting a stronger connection to fundamentals in
the former group. χ2 tests also support the claim that the importance of TB10 differs both across time periods and across
states. When comparing regressions for high price variance
states to those for medium and low price-variance states, the
null that the coefficient for TB10 is the same across states is
always rejected. And, for both sets of states, results from χ2
tests confirm a structural break in the relationship between
TB10 and growth in housing prices. All of this supports the
notion that housing markets are local, that housing supply
elasticities are heterogeneous across communities, and state
and local characteristics are important factors to consider
when analyzing housing markets.
The yield spread has a statistically significant and positive impact for all of the post-1990 specifications.17 The effect is about 4.8 times larger from the high price variance
states than for median and low price variance states (0.0037
versus 0.0008, respectively). The effect of the slope of the
yield curve is sometimes negative and always statistically
insignificant for pre-1991 specifications and when including all years. The null that the effect of yield spread is the
same across specifications generally cannot be rejected (by
a χ2 test).18 The lag of the yield spread has been shown to be
a good predictor of recessions (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998)
and of economic activity more generally (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991), however, its relationship with house prices
appears to be much weaker. This may be because the correlation between housing prices and economic activity is
not nearly as strong as the relationship between some other
variables, such as residential investment, and economic
growth (Leamer, 2007). And, the past couple of years aside,
negative demand shocks generally manifest themselves in
changes to investment, rather than falling prices.
Another important difference seen when comparing
the regression estimates is the year fixed effects, which allow for year-specific constant terms. Adding the constant
term to the average of the year fixed effects yields an average constant term for the post-1990 specification of 0.05, or
well over twice as large as the pre-1991 measure (0.02). At
first glance, it appears that fixed effects explain much more
of the growth in the later period. However, it more likely reflects the fact that average real housing price growth for the
US was much higher from 1991 to 2009 than for years 1975–
1990, the past few years notwithstanding. In fact, as measured by OFHEO housing price index, average annual real
housing price growth was 3.8 times greater in the latter period (1.72% versus 0.45%). Comparing the same measure
(i.e., the constant term plus the average of the year fixed effects) across states (instead of across time periods) yields an
estimate for the states with low to medium house price vari-

in

Journal

of

Housing Economics 20 (2011)

ance that is roughly three times the corresponding measured
for the high variance states (0.06 versus 0.02, respectively).
Again, the states with high variances in housing prices also
had much greater real house price appreciation over years
1975–2009, even after factoring in the recent decline, which
likely goes a long way in explaining the larger fixed effects
for the regressions that include only these states.
In addition to these differences, the estimated root mean
square error (RMSE) also differs greatly across time-periods, with the pre-1991 specifications yielding RMSEs three
to four times as large as those for the post-1990 specifications. For the pre-1991 specifications, the RMSE always exceeds 0.04; for the three post-1990 specifications, the RMSE
is 0.01 (or slightly larger). When including all years, the
RMSE is about 0.03. (Interestingly, for a given time-period,
the RMSE varies little across state groupings.) These differences have important implications for the forthcoming
Monte Carlo exercise and the resulting stress test scenarios.
In sum and in broad terms, the estimation suggests dramatic differences in the underlying statistically based characterizations of the pre- and post-1990 periods. The more recent regime and the high price variance states show house
price growth being much less sensitive to what are typically
thought to be the “real” drivers of house price growth—employment growth and interest rates—less mean reversion,
much more sensitivity to recent momentum in house price
growth, and a lower constant growth rate. This relationship is more pronounced in the post-1990 era and especially
among the high price variance states in that period.
4.2. The distribution of changes in house prices
Here, the estimated coefficients lay the foundation for a
Monte Carlo simulation model. The simulation serves two
broad purposes. First, it provides insights into the comparative statics implied by all aspects of the model estimates,
including the implications regarding the mean square error
and the role of momentum. Second, it generates estimates
of specific stress test scenarios associated with extreme outcomes, which is a key goal of this paper.
4.2.1. Monte Carlo method
Estimated coefficients from the various regressions are
used to project house price growth rates over three years
(12 quarters). In addition to the estimated coefficients, inputs into the simulation include lagged values of employment growth, house price growth and interest rates in the
year prior to the projection, as well as employment growth
and interest rate scenarios during the three years of the
projection. Prior to the Monte Carlo simulation, the regression estimates are used to generate predicted housing price
paths over 12 quarters, where the predicted values are imputed by combining out-sample-data with the estimated
regression coefficients.19 In place of generating separate

17. Given the rate for TB10, an increase in the spread implies a reduction in the short-term interest rate.
18. The one exception, where the null is rejected, is when comparing the pre-1991 and post-1990 specification that includes all states (columns 4
and 7 of Table 2).
19. The constant term for these imputations is equal to the estimated constant term plus the (weighted) average of the estimated coefficients on the
year dummies.
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price paths for each state, we begin with a stylized dataset
for our projection—which represents a hypothetical state
(or composite of several states).20 For this process, housing price growth is treated as an endogenous variable and
generated iteratively. That is, because lags of the dependent variable are included as explanatory variables, out-ofsample predicted values must be generated iteratively, one
quarter at a time. After each iteration, the newly imputed
value for housing price growth then becomes the one quarter lag for housing price growth used in the next iteration.
The process begins with a benign set of assumptions regarding starting lagged values and inputted values for employment and interest rates for the 12 quarters; thus, we refer to the predicted values as a “projected” price path as
opposed to a “forecast” of what will actually occur given
current conditions. Less benign assumptions regarding
the inputted data are also explored in the sensitivity analysis, however, an important part of our analysis is to test
whether, even from a benign starting point, the estimated
relationships presented earlier are capable of producing
substantial drops in housing prices with probabilities, that
while very low, are large enough to have important economic consequences.21 For the different estimated equations, the model is then used to generate 1000 separate 12
quarter paths for housing prices. The Monte Carlo method
is similar to generating out-of-sample predicted values
with a couple of twists:
1. For each year of the three-year projection, the year fixedeffect is chosen at random (based on the actual share
of observations for which each dummy is included in
the relevant regression). Which year fixed effects are
used is tremendously important. Assumptions regarding the year fixed effects could be circumvented by excluding year dummies from the regressions. However,
as shown earlier in this section, the year fixed effects
are extremely important and appear to control for substantial unobserved heterogeneity. Excluding the year
fixed effects would almost surely bias the estimated
coefficients.
2. For each quarter of the projection, a stochastic term is
added to the prediction. The stochastic term is normally
distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation equal
to the RMSE (i.e., the standard deviation of the error
term from the regression).
From the 1000 paths generated from each specification, 1000 cumulative three-year housing price changes can
be calculated. These cumulative price changes represent
the distribution of projected outcomes. Year fixed effects
capture unobserved factors unique to a particular year—
such as general economic conditions etc. Randomly choosing which fixed effect to include in the projection assumes
that these unobserved factors are likely to occur again with
similar probabilities as observed in the data. With this approach, unobserved factors can be used to better formu-
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late the distribution of possible outcomes without the understanding the complexity underlying these factors—or to
what degree specific unobserved factors are playing. Note
that while this approach is used to gain insight into the severity of low probability events, it is not done by simply employing a (log-) linear model and extrapolating it out to extremes (that may not be present in the estimating data). For
example, low probability events are not simulated by inputting extreme values for lagged employment or housing price
growth, or by inputting extreme interest rate scenarios into
a linear model. This approach would assume that estimated
linear relationships hold over a much longer range than
what is reasonable. On the contrary, here extreme outcomes
are generated from uncertainty that is observed in the data
and measured by the RMSE and the influence of unobserved
factors captured in the year fixed effects.
To reiterate and expound on some issues raised earlier,
this approach is built on a highly simplified model of the
housing market, however, despite its simplicity, we believe
that the approach is insightful and the costs associated with
a richer model likely exceed the benefits. First, given the
number and immense complexities of events occurring in
recent years, identifying structural parameters, at this point
in time, is likely to produce results that are either misleading or ones that contain so much uncertainty so as to have
little practical value. While maintaining a reduced form approach, the model could still be made more complex. For
example, additional explanatory variables could be added
or a vector autoregression (VAR) framework could be adopted that would treat employment (and potentially other
variables) as endogenous. The downside of adding additional variables is that this requires additional assumptions for the out-of-sample observations needed to generate the projected housing price paths. This adds another
layer of uncertainty to the process and makes assessing the
importance of a few core fundamental variables less transparent. Additionally, many of the available variables that
could potentially be added to the model are highly correlated with either housing price growth or employment
growth, which limits their value added. The downside of
a VAR approach is that it also hampers transparency. On
the plus side, a VAR recognizes that variables such as employment and housing price growth do not move independently, however, expecting to correctly identifying this
relationship over the past decade (with any degree of precision) is likely quixotic.
With our approach the implications from alternative employment or interest rate scenarios can easily be explored.
(For example, see the sensitivity analysis later in this section.) While this does not allow for a dynamic relationship
between the housing and employment markets, for example, analyzing the impact of a shock to one of these sectors
is again quite transparent. To the extent that one believes
that these markets play off each other, via feedback loops,
projected paths can be viewed as lower (or upper) bounds.

20. The stylized dataset uses average values, by quarter, for each of the economic variables. These values are used as the initial lags and are repeated for each year of the projection (the exception being housing price growth).
21. Later, out-of-sample state forecasts that start with observed state-level data are also explored.

Calculations based on data from FHFA (formerly OFHEO), BLS, and U.S. Treasury. Estimated regression coefficients, a key component of this simulation, are presented in Table 2. Note,
projections are not made for greyed-out areas. Such projections, if they were made, would apply to states that were excluded from the underlying regression.
a. The standard (or root mean square) error of the regression.
b. Based on the model and underlying assumptions, a drop of this magnitude is projected to occur once every 20 years.
c. Based on the model and underlying assumptions, a drop of this magnitude is projected to occur once every 100 years.
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22. Also, note that for the post-1990 regression that includes all states,
the estimated coefficients on the state group dummies equal 0 (at
least when rounding to three decimal points); thus, projections
based on this regression do not vary by state group.

Years:

4.2.2. Results from the Monte Carlo simulation
Results from the simulation are summarized in Table
4. The first row of Table 4 reports the RMSE for each of
the regressions. The remainder of the table shows the cumulative percent change in projected real house prices at
the end of the 12 quarter projection for each of the different regressions and at different points in the distribution.
The top set of projections are for “group 1” states in the
sense that the group 1 (i.e., high price variance) dummy
is set to 1. The lower set of projections are for states in
group 3 (i.e., states with lowest housing price variances)
in the sense that all state group dummies are set to 0 (and
thus, the constant term pertains to group 3, the dummy
that was dropped in the regression). For columns 2, 5 and
8, projections labeled as group 3 are the same as those for
group 1, since the corresponding regressions include only
data on group 1 states. For columns 3, 6 and 9, projections for group 1 are the same as those for group 3, since
here, the corresponding regressions include only data on
groups 1 and 2.22
Based on the regression results when including all
of the data, a severe stress event, associated with a onepercent probability, yields a cumulative price decline of
between 19% and 23% after 12 quarters. The price decline associated with a one-percent stress scenario is also
within this same range when relying on the regressions
that include all quarters, but subsets of states (columns 2
and 3). Corresponding estimates for the severity of a fivepercent stress scenario are between 5.2 and 6.6 percentage
points lower. Turning to the results based on regressions
for the other subsamples yields very different results—
suggesting that the structural breaks found in the regression analysis have important implications for low probability events. Using the pre-1991 regression results,
one-percent scenarios are associated with price declines
of between 22% and 29%. The results based on the group
1 regression yield an over 27% price decline. For the post1990 regressions, simulation results are even more dire,
with one-percent scenarios associated with price declines
of between 33% and 40%. The 40% decline results from
the post-1990 regression and including all states. It is this
scenario that stands out. When including all data or only
pre-1991 data, the projected severity of one-percent scenarios are 25–50% smaller.
The past few years aside, the one-percent scenarios presented in Table 4 are much more severe than any
threeyear experience for the nation or for any of the three
groups of states examined here. For example, the sharpest real (employment-weighted) 12-quarter price decline
ranges from 10.6 (for group 1 states) to 15.6% (for group
2 states). (Refer to Figure 2.) However, many states have
experienced 12 quarter price declines similar to the onepercent simulation results. For example, 26 states have
experienced 12-quarter real price declines of more than
20%, while 7 states have experienced real price declines

in

(9)
Groups 2 & 3

Follain & Giertz

Table 4. Core simulation results cumulative percent change in housing prices after 3 years (with stochastic shocks and random year fixed effects).
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Figure 3. Simulated housing price distributions. (A) Based on data
from 1975 to 2009. (B) Based on data from 1975 to 1990. (C) Based
on data from 1991 to 2009. Source: Authors’ calculations simulated
housing price distributions in this figure. For each legend entry, the
group(s) listed before the colon refers to the states included in the regression used for the simulation. After the colon, the group of states
that the projections apply to is listed. Three-year cumulative house
price changes are normalized so that 1.00 implies zero real growth in
house prices.

exceeding 30%.23 While the magnitude of the decline in
house prices in recent years (at the state level) is unusual,
what is more unusual appears to be the correlation in
housing price changes across states. For example, the 12
quarter price decline for group 1 states is more than double anything this group experienced prior to the Great Recession. Prior to 2006, large price drops in one state (or region) were partially offset by stronger housing markets in
other parts of the country—this time that was not true.
While the severity of a one-percent scenario has increased
substantially in the latter period, the projected housing price
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distribution does not widen. In fact, density plots in Figure 3 show that the reverse is true—i.e., the price distribution is much tighter post-1990. This is driven to a large degree by the much smaller RMSE for the post-1990 period. As
noted earlier, the RMSE increases by roughly a factor of four
when moving from post-1991 to pre-1990. (Recall that the
standard deviation of the stochastic term used in the simulation equals the regression RMSE.) The difference between
the median and onepercent scenario was between 34 and 37
percentage points when using pre-1991 regressions. Post1990, this difference falls to between 8 and 11 percentage
points. Thus, despite a tighter price distribution, the severity
of a one percent scenario increases substantially post-1991.
In fact, the median price change from the post-1990 projections is a price decline of between 22% and 32%! Pre-1991, the
median of the projected price changes ranges from increases
of 5–15%. The tightening of the post-1990 price distribution is also observed when comparing the oneand five-percent scenarios. Pre-1991, one-percent scenarios are projected
to be 8–12 percentage points worse than five-percent scenarios. Post-1990, this difference drops to between two and four
percentage points.
The evidence suggests a structural break and the simulations based on post-1990 data look very different from those
for the earlier period. This suggests that a new housing price
stress test may be in order. However, the simulation results
based on post-1990 data are peculiar—and do not seem sensible. For example, it does not seem reasonable expect housing prices to fall substantially (i.e., the median scenario) and
for the uncertainty about future price changes to be much
smaller than in the past.24 One alternative would be to construct a stress scenario using all of the years of data. But, at
the cost of simplicity, adjust the path based on several factors, such as the location of the housing, creditworthiness of
borrowers and short-term trends designed to capture momentum within the market. What is clear from the simulations is that OFHEO’s ALMO stress test appears quite weak
compared to any of our alternatives.
4.3. Additional sensitivity checks
Table 5 presents a number of alternative 12-quarter
price declines for one- and five-percent scenarios. These alternatives test the robustness of our core results. Recall that
the simulation results presented in Table 4 were generated
assuming a benign employment and interest rate regime.
In some instances these checks support substantially more
severe stress scenario.
One of the sensitivity checks replaces the benign employment scenario with a severe one. The severe employment scenario is based on the worst 16 quarter experience
of any state present in the HPI data. In this case, the employment path is that experienced by Michigan between

23. These numbers are based on the HPI (beginning in 1975) and exclude post-2001 data. Extending the data through quarter 3 of 2009 increases
the number of states that have experienced declines of 20% or more to 32; and, the number that have experienced declines of 30% or more to 11.
24. Given that these simulated distributions are generated using a benign economic starting scenario, the model certainly does not seem to perform well here. It may be that the regression specification, while reduced form and not restrictive in many of its assumptions, is not flexible
enough to accurately models this later period. Alternative regression specifications could allow for nonlinear relationships or allow estimated
coefficients to vary depending on whether house prices are rising or falling.
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Calculations based on data from FHFA (formerly OFHEO), BLS, and U.S. Treasury. Estimated regression coefficients, a key component of this simulation, are presented in Table 2. Note,
projections are not made for greyed-out areas. Such projections, if they were made, would apply to states that were excluded from the underlying regression.
a. Based on the model and underlying assumptions, a drop of this magnitude is projected to occur once every 20 years.
b. Based on the model and underlying assumptions, a drop of this magnitude is projected to occur once every 100 years.
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Table 5. Sensitivity checks to simulation results cumulative percent change in housing prices after 3 years (with stochastic shocks and random year fixed effects).
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1978 and 1982, when employment fell by a total of 14%. Replacing the benign employment scenario with this severe
one yields much greater price declines. For specifications
using all years of data or pre-1991 data, this results in onepercent house price drops that are almost 40 to over 70%
larger than the analogous results (presented in Table 4).
Thus, instead of the 19–23% decline in house prices under
the benign employment scenario (and including all years of
data), one-percent price declines are now nearly one-third,
or greater. Again, see Table 5.
A second sensitivity check raises the ten-year Treasury
rate by one standard deviation (2.77 percentage points) for
the entire 12 quarter projection, but leaves the yield spread
unchanged. This is intended to examine the implication of
a jump in mortgage interest rates on severe stress scenarios. For the specifications including all years of data, this
interest rate shock results in one-percent price declines
that are 25–73% larger—i.e., price declines of between 27%
and 38%.
A third check performs the same Monte Carlo exercise
used for Table 4, but replaces the estimated regression coefficients with ones that are employment-weighted. See
Table 3, which compares lagged coefficients from the employment-weighted specification to those from the unweighted approach. Employment-weighting adjusts for
the fact that states differ tremendously in size. Without employment-weighting, the experience of Wyoming, for example, is given equal weight as that of California or Texas.
For the post-1990 period, income-weighting has little affect
on the simulation results. For the other timeperiods, however, house price declines during one-percent scenarios are
roughly 30% smaller than without employment weighting.
Thus, while the adverse employment scenario suggest a
more severe stress scenario than those in Table 4, employment weighting lends support for a less severe scenario.
Finally, the simulation is performed assuming a constant RMSE. Recall that for each quarterly projection a random component is added with mean 0 and a standard deviation equal to that from the respective regression. As
noted earlier, the RMSE is much smaller for the post-1990
period. Here, the RMSE from the specification that includes all of the data is always used for the standard deviation on the stochastic term. For the full period, this has little impact, since these specification all have RMSEs that are
(equal to or) very close to the new constant value. For the
two sub-periods, the results are mixed. In some instances,
one-percent scenarios are similar to the analogous cases
from Table 4. In one instance (projections for group 1 states
based on post-1990 data), the estimate is 74% larger. In this
instance, the RMSE used is 2.5 times the size of the one associated with the estimated coefficients used in the simulation. As noted earlier, many of the post-1990 projections
are peculiar. In this instance, even the 99th percentile suggests a substantial price decline. At the other extreme, the
specification that includes all states and pre-1991 data finds
the price decline at the first percentile that is much more
modest—ranging from 14% to 21%. In this case, the constant RMSE assumption reduces the standard deviation of
the stochastic term by more than 40%.
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5. Conclusions: Putting it all together
We investigate whether statistical models estimated at
different time periods and for different groups of states
would lead to a clear conclusion about whether a new
housing price stress test—replacing OFHEO’s ALMO scenario—seems appropriate. Regression analysis finds that
estimated parameters are quite sensitive to the period and
groups of states used to estimate the model. There seem
to be two offsetting effects at work. The models based
upon earlier data show greater sensitivity to employment
growth and the level of interest rates and, also, suggest a
higher constant rate of growth in real house prices than
models estimated using data from later years. These all
tend to lead to lower stress tests and lower credit costs,
all else equal. Offsetting these patterns is the fact that the
RMSE for the earlier models is larger than that estimated
in later years. Also, the parameters from the model estimated using more recent data suggest substantial momentum from recent house price trends, which is consistent with bubble phenomena and greater potential for
extreme price volatility. More momentum implies less
mean reversion. This is true throughout the post-1990 period, but is more pronounced for group 1 (high price volatility) states.
Thus, whatever conclusions we draw rest upon some
judgments about the particular scenarios and assumptions
used in the simulation analysis that generates stress scenarios (and which could then be used to estimate credit costs).
The models estimated since the 1990s generate more stressful scenarios than ones based upon earlier data. That is, the
5th or 1st percentile outcomes are much worse than previous models would have suggested. In terms of the Katrina
example, the more recent estimates suggest that the 100
year flood is worse than previously thought. However, the
simulated housing price distributions using only post-1990
data are peculiar: the distribution has a much smaller variance than for the other time-periods and the distributions
suggest almost no prospect for real price growth. For example, these results sometimes suggest that even 99th percentile scenario (i.e., an extremely strong housing market)
sometimes shows price declines. While insights (with respect to momentum etc.) can be gleaned from the post-1990
analysis, simulations based on this period alone likely do
not represent sensible scenarios.
However, when using all years of data (or even only
pre-1991 data), it still appears that a new housing price
stress test is desired. Even with benign assumptions with
respect to employment growth and interest rates, simulations suggest that the ALMO test is too weak. Incorporating more severe employment or interest rate environments
makes the case for a new, more severe, stress test even
stronger. On balance, the sensitivity checks point toward a
more severe stress scenario than what use for our core scenario. Although, the employment-weighted regression results weaken this conclusion.
From the numerous results generated via a relatively
simple and single equation model of house prices, several
additional conclusions can be drawn:
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1. During normal economic circumstances, the results
based upon the full sample seem plausible. That is, a 3
year decline in real prices of about 20% (Table 4 column
1) seems appropriate for a 1% degree of security and
about 15% for a 5% degree of security.
2. As concerns about a recession rise, which was surely the
case at the end of 2006, our sensitivity analysis suggests
a stress test scenario with decline of more than 40% (see
Table 5 and the 2 standard deviation shock to employment). This is quite similar to the recent FRB stress test
when one accounts for 2006 and 2007 growth rates leading up to the numbers they project for the following
two years, 2009 and 2010.
3. Our results are based upon real price changes. Nominal
shocks would be larger during inflationary times and
should be adjusted accordingly. See Figure 1, which
shows that the ALMO scenario was a weaker test in
the years leading up to the Great Recession (than it was
during the 1980s) because it was defined in nominal
terms. According to the recent FRB minutes, the stress
scenario ought to be increased by 3%, which is the midpoint of their forecasts of inflation over the next three
years.25
4. The correlation between house prices across states increased in recent years. This contributed to the financial crisis, but whether this pattern will continue is not
known. The distribution of house prices for Group 1
states is wider with a higher expected value than that
for Group 2 and 3 states. This was not the case pre-1991
when the distribution of prices for Group 1 states was
much more skewed to the left. Part of this ambiguity
probably stems from the use of state data. Our guess is
that variations among markets will be more clear-cut if
MSA data are used. Absent stronger evidence, we suggest that the regulators give much more attention to
this issue going forward and prepare stronger stress
tests for different parts of the country as circumstances
suggest.
The results also suggest two other changes to the ALMO
process. First, a stress test ought to be continually updated
to incorporate new information. The resulting stress test
will vary as new data and market conditions arise, as the
parameterization of the house price process change, and
as sensitivities to changes other economic variables evolve.
Second, a stress test should be stated in real and not nominal terms. If ALMO had been applied in real terms, perhaps additional capital would have been held and the consequences of the Great Recession (of 2007–2009) would
have been less onerous. Stress testing is an ongoing process that adjusts to changing market conditions including
inflation. Legislating a stress test scenario stated in nominal terms that holds for an extended period seems to lack
justification.
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Evidence supporting substantial variations in the stress
test scenario across groups of states is ambiguous. In fact,
there is some evidence of increased correlation among
states. This is issue is ripe for additional research to ascertain whether this increased correlation is an aberration or
something expected to continue. If it continue, then the
added value from geographical variations to the stress test
may be small; however, such increased correlation would
surely imply a reduction in the benefits from geographically diversifying portfolios, and would substantially lower
the benefits from geographic diversification cited by Calem
and Follain (2003).
One topic of ongoing debate is whether regulatory capital levels and, in essence, the stress test ought to vary over
the business cycle (BIS, 2010). For example, more stressful
scenarios may be appropriate during the boom part of a cycle in order to provide above average amounts of capital.
Similarly, a less stringent stress test might be more appropriate during a recessionary period in order not to diminish the time to recovery. The Basel III plan is an example of
a countercylical capital policy. Our results do not address
this issue since the basic set of initial economic conditions
for our simulations are the same. An extension of our work
could be developed that would generate simulations for
different sets of starting conditions.
More generally, we readily acknowledge that these
judgments are based upon our reading of these results and
many others that we have considered. The simulation exercise is complex (even with a relatively simple underlying econometric model) and there is little doubt that some
analysts might reach different judgments; however, it is
surely the case that the process and resulting picture could
be made much more complex. For example, consider the
thorny issue of regional diversification, not addressed here.
Further consider potential variations in the stress test scenarios based upon initial conditions prior to the stress; or
variations in interest rate conditions—which until the recent crisis was considered by many experts the most serious threat to the mortgage market. All of these would increase complexity, further cloud transparency and heighten
the need for subjective judgments by those responsible for
defining a stress test scenario. On the other hand, this paper underscores the contention that stress test scenarios are
inherently complex and should not be written in stone by
legislation. Rather, a team of independent analysts ought
to be constantly in search of whether a change in the status quo is needed. They should be expected to make their
best case, but the ultimate decision-makers should harbor
no illusions that the evidence underlying the final recommendations of an extreme event will be crystal clear. We
are confident of this much.

25. See Table 1 in http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20100127.pdf .
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